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THE NAFTA ALTERNATIVE:
SAVING KORUS FTA DUMPING APPEALS
FROM THE DUMPS
Czarina Powell*
ABSTRACT: Antidumping duties are a trade remedy often utilized against producers in the
United States’ own bilateral trading partners. Because of Chevron deference, foreign
companies are at greater risk of being branded “dumpers” simply upon the onset of a petition.
On March 15, 2013, the United States celebrated the one-year anniversary of the signing into
force of the Korea-US (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement and its promise to eliminate barriers
and tariffs. This article acknowledges the importance of the Republic of Korea as a U.S.
trading partner, and proposes an alternative appeals system for dumping disputes between the
two countries; one that embodies the spirit of the WTO Agreement, while still protecting
American industries against harm. This article argues that the system created in the NAFTA
binational panel is the fairest and more effective method of resolving dumping disputes. This
article calls for the extension and implementation of NAFTA binational panels for all KORUS
FTA dumping disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) today unanimously ruled
that unlawful pricing by Samsung and LG caused injury to the U.S. clothes
washer industry . . . .Whirlpool Corporation (NYSE: WHR) welcomes today’s
decision, which is in response to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy petitions filed by
the company in December 2011 on behalf of the U.S. appliance industry.”1 LG
responded by stating “LG respects the work the ITC staff and commission have
put into this determination, but we disagree with the result, which will harm US
retailers and consumers.”2
On January 23, 2013, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) issued an antidumping
duty order against the Republic of South Korea, on all large residential washers
from LG Electronics, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Daewoo
* J.D. (Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2014); Assistant State’s Attorney,
Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Chicago, Illinois.
1
Press Release, Whirlpool Corp., Victory for American Washer Industry: Ruling
Supports U.S. Workers and Consumers (2013), http://investors.whirlpoolcorp.com/
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=735328 [hereinafter Whirlpool Corp.].
2
LG Electronics USA, LG Electronics Disputes ITC Injury Finding in Washing Machine
Antidumping Case, PR Newswire (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/lg-electronics-disputes-itc-injury-finding-in-washing-machine-antidumping-case-188058261.
html.
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Electronics Corporation. 3 Commerce, from its antidumping investigations,
determined that the Korean corporations had sold their products at “less-than-fair
value” in the United States, while the ITC found that the domestic industry was
materially injured. 4 Marc Bitzer, President of Whirlpool Corporation, the
American corporation that had initiated the antidumping petition against its
Korean competitors, hailed the antidumping duty as “a great victory for the U.S.
appliance industry”5 and stated that Whirlpool’s decision to petition for the trade
remedy was premised on “defend[ing] the integrity of the global trading
system.”6
At first blush, the issue seems cut and dry: a foreign firm “dumps” its
product in the U.S. market for a lower price than it sells at home; U.S. firms
struggle to compete with this unfair trade, leading American companies to be
injured in their own market. Upon further review, the broad grant of discretion
bestowed upon Commerce and the ITC to determine (1) whether the foreign firm
has “dumped,” its goods in the United States for less than they have sold them at
home, 7 and (2) whether a U.S. industry was materially injured by this
“dumping,”8 reveals flaws, and because of the high level of Chevron deference9
granted to these agency decisions by the Court of International Trade and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the dumping petition sticks: once a
dumper, always a dumper.
This article will argue that the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) binational panel process under NAFTA Ch. 19, created to resolve
antidumping disputes between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, are an
effective dispute mechanism that should be instituted and applied to antidumping
appeals between the United States and South Korea. The five-person binational
panel, as an alternative to the current U.S. domestic judicial review system, is
more in-tune with World Trade Organization (“WTO”) priorities and would give
more effect to the spirit of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement
(“KORUS FTA”) and free trade at large, fostering stronger relations with the
Republic of Korea, one of the largest U.S. trading partners, while still protecting
domestic markets against harm. The focus of this article is on the special
binational panel appeals process the United States has carved out for Canada and
Mexico, and the argument that these procedures should be extended to
antidumping disputes between the U.S. and South Korea.
3

Large Residential Washers from Mexico and the Republic of Korea: Antidumping Duty
Orders, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (Feb. 15, 2013).
4
Id.
5
Whirlpool Corp., supra note 1.
6
See Whirlpool Corp., Defending U.S. Jobs, WhirlpoolCorp.com, http://www.
whirlpoolcorp.com/facts/.
7
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2013) (stating that the “administrating authority determines
that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold” for less than fair
value). See also 19 U.S.C. §1677(1) (2013) (stating that “[t]he term ‘administering authority’
means the Secretary of Commerce”).
8
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (2013) (stating that the Commission determines material injury
or retardation of a domestic industry). See also 19 U.S.C. §1677(2) (2013) (stating that “[t]he
term ‘‘Commission’’ means the United States International Trade Commission”).
9
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Part II of this article will assess the background of the United States’ current
antidumping dispute system. Part III will analyze the importance of United
States’ trade relations with South Korea and parallel it with the relations the U.S.
has with Canada and Mexico. Part IV will analyze the NAFTA binational panels
as an effective alternative antidumping appeals system. Part V will discuss the
spirit of the WTO Agreement and how binational panels work better to uphold
the ideas of free trade. Part VI will argue for the feasibility of implementing a
binational panel for the United States and South Korea, and Part VII will
conclude with why the antidumping binational panel is needed in lieu of the
status quo.

II. BACKGROUND: THE UNITED STATES’ ANTI-DUMPING SYSTEM
The United States assesses dumping remedies according to Title VII of the
Tariff Act.10 Dumping is defined as the sale of foreign merchandise in the United
States “at less than its fair value” that causes material injury to or retardation of a
U.S. industry.11 If the administrative agencies tasked with investigating dumping
deem that dumping has taken place, they assess an antidumping duty to offset the
difference between the product’s “normal value” and the “less than its fair
value.” 12 The antidumping duty is levied after making “adjustments for
differences in the merchandise, quantities purchased, and circumstances of the
sale.”13
A. The “interested party” petition process

While Commerce may initiate an antidumping investigation “on its own
motion,” 14 it “rarely does.” 15 Instead, a domestic company may file a petition
with Commerce, or simultaneously with the ITC as an “interested party” on
behalf of an industry.16 Private parties initiate more than ninety percent of all the
antidumping cases filed.17 Once a party files a petition, the petition then proceeds
through Commerce and the ITC according to the statutory timetable.18 While the
statute allows for interested parties to launch petitions of their own, it is hard to
delineate what part of the petition is done for altruistic reasons and what part is
done to potentially curb the success of a foreign competitor. 19 There are
10
See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, Title VII, updated through
Pub. L. No. 103-465 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a) (2013).
11
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2013).
12
Id.
13
See Robert Carpenter, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Antidumping and Countervailing
Handbook, I-3, note 2 (13th ed. 2008).
14
Id. at II-4, note 8. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (2013).
15
Carpenter, supra note 13, at II-4, note 8.
16
19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)1 (2013).
17
See Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal The Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. Int’l L. &
Bus. 491 at 547 (1993).
18
See infra Figure 1, note 30.
19
See McGee, supra note 17, at 547-48, 551 (suggesting that as “[n]early all of the
ANTIDUMPING petitions that U.S. companies file with the Commerce Department result in an
investigation,” coupled with the fact that “companies are never penalized for submitting
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underlying notions that “antidumping is not about remedying unfair trade
practices . . . but about protecting the domestic products of the importing
country.”20
Whirlpool, in the example given at start of this article, signed a petition on
March 11, 2011 directed to James R. Holbein, Acting Secretary of the ITC,
requesting that Korean and Mexican corporations be investigated for their
“Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator-Freezers” originating in the Republic
of Korea and Mexico. 21 While it seems anti-competitive for a domestic U.S.
company to petition the U.S. government for relief against a foreign competitor,
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine gives private parties immunity “from antitrust
scrutiny when they lobby the government for certain benefits, even if the
lobbying inhibits competition.”22 Whirlpool Corporation would be shielded from
accusations that it initiated the antidumping petition against South Korean
corporations due to “trade-restraining behaviors.”23 There is a “sham” exception
to this protection. However, the exception has been limited to applying only to
the antidumping process, not the outcome. 24 This limitation lends fuel to the
argument that those industries that petition against dumping on the basis of
“unfair trade” are in fact, seeking [unfair] protection from foreign rivals.25
It is this self-interested petitioning that launches antidumping investigations
and because of the deference the federal courts give to administrative agencies,
foreign competitors are essentially branded with a scarlet “D” once a U.S.
domestic industry views it as a threat.
B. A Discretionary Investigation Process

Once a petition has been initiated, Commerce and the ITC decide whether to
pursue an investigation by making preliminary determinations as to (1) whether
there is dumping, and (2) whether a U.S. industry has been materially injured by
it. 26 While the timetable for the preliminary and final determinations is
incorrect or knowingly false information,” lending to the notion that domestic U.S. industries
are “using government as a club - to batter [their] opponents and get what [they] want,”
bringing into question the “[e]thics of [u]sing the [A]NTIDUMPING [l]aws as a [w]eapon”).
20
Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 Mich. J. Int’l L. 151, 156-157 (2012)
[hereinafter Zheng].
21
Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator Freezers from Korea and Mexico, USITC
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-477 and 731-TA-1180-1181 (Final), United States International
Trade Commission Pub. 4318 (May 2012).
22
Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct
Market Competition, 87 N.C.L. Rev. 357 at 361 (2009) [hereinafter Cho]. See also Eastern R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that competitors
seeking to influence public officials did not amount to illegal anticompetitive conduct under
the Sherman Act); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)
(holding that a party who petitions the government for action favorable to themselves cannot
be sued under the Sherman Anti Trust Act, even if anti-competitiveness may be the motivating
factor behind the party’s actions).
23
See Cho, id.
24
Id.
25
Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 1153 at 1171 (1989).
26
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (2013).
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systematic and structured,27 Commerce and the ITC, as administrative agencies,
are granted wide, discretionary berth when determining the application of the
antidumping statutes.28
U.S. antidumping duties have been attacked as flawed on multiple fronts,29
and although the specifics of the issues are beyond the scope of this article, they
are numerous and further fuel the argument that foreign companies are not
afforded an effective appeals system because these agency decisions are upheld.

Figure 1: Antidumping Timetable in days.30
27

See infra Figure 1 & note 31.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(regarding the second prong of the Chevron test that states where Congress has not spoken
specifically to the matter, that the administrative agency has discretion to interpret at will, and
courts will uphold the interpretation as long as reasonable) [hereinafter Chevron]. See also
Tariff Act of 1930, § 771(7)(C)(ii)(I–II), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(C)(ii)(I–III)
(establishing the ITC’s broad discretion to assess evidence on price undercutting in its
investigation and the “dumping” impact on the domestic industry).
29
See generally Zheng, supra note 20, at 158 (arguing to eliminate the unfair pricing
mechanism). See also Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. &
Econ. 1, 14 (1995) (arguing that “[a]s long as the exporter’s marginal revenue from sales in the
importing country exceeds its marginal cost of production, the exporter is behaving in an
economically rational fashion”); Edward Tracy, NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Reviews
– Still a Zero Sum Game: The Wire Rod Decision and its Progeny, 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.
173, 177 (2012) (arguing that “[d]espite a vast body of international jurisprudence outlawing
zeroing, U.S. courts sanctioned the practice”) [hereinafter Tracy].
30
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATUTORY TIMETABLES FOR
28
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C. The Appellate Process: Chevron Deference Solidifies Agency Discretion

Once the DOC or the ITC has issued positive antidumping duty orders
against the foreign company, the foreign company may petition either agency to
appeal.31 The importer has thirty days after the publication of the antidumping
duty order to challenge the assessment of the antidumping duty on its
merchandise.32 The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction to hear appeals
of antidumping, as does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.33
While there is an appeals process in place, courts give great deference to the
administrative agencies due to the Chevron doctrine.34 Accordingly, tremendous
deference is given to the expertise of the Secretary of Commerce in
administering the antidumping law.35 Courts will only overturn agency action if
the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”36 This standard of review is narrow.37 The court will not
substitute its own judgment for the agency, and the court will look to whether the
agency has provided a rational link between the evidence before it and the
decision the agency made.38 The court will uphold a decision of “less than ideal
clarity” and will only overturn if the agency:
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or [offered an explanation that] is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.39

The Chevron test is premised on two holdings: (1) if Congress’ intention was
clear from the statute then the plain language controls, and (2) if the statute is
ambiguous or silent on the issue at hand, then the agency’s interpretation will be
adopted as the interpretation of the statute, as long as it is reasonable.40 Under 28
U.S.C. § 2643(b), the Court of International Trade must sometimes review issues
de novo:

ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS (2014), http://www.usitc.gov/
trade_remedy/documents/timetable.pdf.
31
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) (2013).
32
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e, 1516a(a)(2) (2013).
33
28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(c), 1295(a)(5) (2013).
34
See Chevron, supra note 28.
35
See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Mach. Workers,
6 F.3d 1511 at 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also Smith-Corona v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568
at 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
36
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 at 229 (2001). See also Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2013) (stating “the reviewing court shall -- (2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be -- (A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
37
See Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 637 F. Supp.
2d 1270, 1285 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009).
38
Id. at 1286.
39
Id.
40
See Chevron, supra note 28.
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If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct
decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court
may order a retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further
administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary
to reach the correct decision.41

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts can still give deference to an
agency’s regulations while simultaneously reviewing the facts anew. 42
“Deference can be given to the [agency’s] regulations without impairing the
authority of the court to make factual determinations, and to apply those
determinations to the law, de novo.”43 This implicates foreign exporters and their
ability to fight the antidumping duties in the current appeals system. An agency
determination is given great weight, and even in cases where the issues are to be
determined by the reviewing court de novo, agency regulations will be worked
into the legal framework that analyze the facts of the case. This makes it nearly
impossible to have an agency decision overturned, reinforcing the notion that
once petitioned against, the “dumper” is doomed.
Even in cases where plaintiffs have proven that the antidumping duty should
be revoked, Commerce retains “unfettered discretion” as to whether to maintain
the duty, and it “may” revoke the duty if it so chooses. 44 The Secretary of
Commerce is not required to grant revocation, even if it is warranted.45 When
reviewing final “material injury” determinations, the reviewing court must give
the ITC “appropriate deference in its interpretation of the material injury
statute.”46 In the instances where the Court of International Trade or the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit find that the ITC duty was not supported by
“substantial evidence,”47 the courts remand the determinations back to the agency
for reconsideration. 48 In only two cases has the ITC “reversed a final injury
decision in response to a court remand for reconsideration.” 49 The outlook
continues to be bleak for foreign companies.
D. Changed Circumstance and The Sunset Clause

Commerce may revoke an antidumping duty if “changed circumstances”
warrant revocation or if “a majority of U.S. producers have expressed a lack of
interest in continued enforcement of the antidumping order.50 Commerce granted
revocation in seventy-six cases from January 1995 to December 2009; however,
41

28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (2013).
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 at 381 (1999).
43
Id. at 390-92.
44
See Toshiba Corp. v. United States, 15 C.I.T. 597 at 598 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1991).
45
Id.
46
Nucor Corp. v. United States, 318 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1212 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) aff’d,
414 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
47
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that any determination or finding that is
unsupported by substantial evidence shall be held unlawful).
48
See Jay Charles Campbell, The Trade Litigant’s Gauntlet: The Hanging Judge and the
Teflon Tribunal, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1, 42 (2011) [hereinafter Campbell].
49
Id. at 42, 43.
50
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1); 19 C.F.R. §351.222(g).
42
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in all cases revocation occurred because of the U.S. industry’s lack of interest in
the continued order, and only one case involved “changed circumstances”.51
Antidumping duties must also be reviewed at a five year mandatory “sunset
review.”52 In the sunset review, the ITC must revoke the antidumping order53
unless it decides that such revocation would lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping “within a reasonably foreseeable time,” 54 or if it would lead to the
continuation or recurrence of material injury to the U.S. industry.55 From July
1998 to May 2005, Commerce found that U.S. industries favored continuation of
every case, all 255, in their sunset reviews.56 Once found to be a dumper, you
will so be branded and penalized for the indefinite future.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. FREE TRADE PARTNERS TO ITS PROSPERITY
A. Korea: KORUS FTA

In terms of overall trade, as of March 2013, South Korea is the United States
number six trading partner, and number eight in terms of total exports. 57
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, on March 15,
2013, the one-year anniversary of the Korea-United States (KORUS) FTA’s
entry into force, the KORUS FTA “[was] living up to its promise to provide
tangible benefits for American businesses and workers . . . [and] also supporting
U.S. exports of goods and services.” 58 U.S. exports to South Korea have
increased in just one year in the manufacturing, transportation equipment, and
agricultural sectors.59
The KORUS FTA was signed on June 30, 2007, approved by Congress on
October 12, 2011, approved the Korea National Assembly on November 22,
2011, 60 and the agreement entered into force on March 15, 2012. 61 President
Obama announced that the KORUS FTA was “a landmark trade deal that [was]
expected to increase annual exports of American goods by up to $11 million and
support at least 70,000 American jobs.”62 Actual figures for U.S. manufacturing
exports to Korea were $34.3 billion for 2011, and $34.8 billion for 2012.63
51

See Campbell, supra note 48, at 32.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c).
53
Id.
54
See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a).
55
See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c).
56
See Campbell, supra note 48, at 33.
57
See Top Trading Partners - Total Trade, Exports, Imports, U.S. Census Bureau (May 2,
2013), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1305cm.html.
58
See Fact Sheet: U.S.-Korea Agreement Bringing Benefits Home, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (May 7, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/
2013/march/us-korea-agreement-bringing-benefits.
59
Id.
60
See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under
the U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta.
61
Id.
62
Barack Obama, President of the United States, The White House, Office of the Press
Sec’y, Statement by the President Announcing the US-Korea Trade Agreement (Dec. 3, 2010),
52
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For the United States, the incentive to enter into a bilateral trade agreement
with South Korea was Korea’s appeal as a major export market for U.S. goods.64
To that end, ninety-five percent of all Korean tariffs on U.S. exports will be
eliminated by January 1, 2016.65 Specifically, the KORUS FTA was intended to
gain U.S. access to the Korean market for the American car and truck industry
and U.S. agricultural products.66 President Obama also stated that the KORUS
FTA would “deepen[] the strong alliance between the United States and the
Republic of Korea.”67
While Korea’s importance as a trading partner is apparent, Korea is still
subject to the United States’ antidumping duties. In fact, from 1985 to 2005, “US
$37.3 billion worth of Korean exports were subject to U.S. trade measures[.]”68
These penalties do not exist in a vacuum, and because of the inability to
effectively appeal such charges, Korea is simultaneously being applauded as a
trading partner while being punished as a trade infringer.
B. Canada and Mexico: NAFTA, a Parallel System

Canada, like South Korea, is an important trading partner to the United
States. As of March 2013, Canada was the United States’ top trading partner in
terms of overall trade and the exports of goods.69 Mexico, in March 2013, was
the third for overall trade with the United States and second for the export of
U.S. goods.70 On January 1, 1994, NAFTA entered into force and by January 1,
2008, all remaining duties and restrictions were eliminated.71 “NAFTA created
the world’s largest free trade area . . . producing $17 trillion worth of goods and
services.”72 The United States’ incentive was to capitalize on the export of its
goods,73 and NAFTA has been a success story in achieving that end. “U.S. goods
export[ed] to NAFTA [countries] in 2010 were $411.5 billion, up 23.4% ($78
billion) from 2009, and 149% from 1994 (the year prior to Uruguay Round) and
up 190% from 1993 (the year prior to NAFTA). U.S. exports to NAFTA
accounted for 32.2% of overall U.S. exports in 2010.”74
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/03/statement-president-announcing-uskorea-trade-agreement.
63
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 60.
64
See Yong-Shik Lee et. al., The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Path to
Common Economic Prosperity or False Promise? 6 E. Asia L. Rev. 111, 118 (2011)
[hereinafter Lee].
65
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 60.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Lee, supra note 63, at n.84.
69
See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 56.
70
See id.
71
See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-americanfree-trade-agreement-nafta.
72
Id.
73
See Matthew Burton, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals: NAFTA
Binational Panels and Foreign Affairs Flexibility, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1529 at 1548 (2002).
74
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 71.
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Beyond the general objective of obtaining “preferential treatment for United
States goods,” the United States also listed in its assessment of NAFTA’s
benefits “monitoring and effective dispute settlement mechanisms to facilitate
compliance with . . . ”, the elimination of barriers to market access for U.S.
goods, the elimination of foreign subsidies potentially injurious to U.S.
industries, and the elimination of export taxes. 75 The finalized NAFTA lists
among its objectives the elimination of barriers to trade between the party
territories,76 and the creation of “effective procedures for the implementation and
application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution
of disputes.”77 The dispute mechanism was one that embraced negotiation and an
alternative diversion procedure for anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters
away from U.S. courts and towards a more inclusive bilateral process. That
mechanism was the NAFTA binational panel process.
While Canada initially sought complete exemption from U.S. antidumping
duties for its exporters, it was finally able to compromise with the United States
on the binational panel system,78 and so the binational panel, originally instituted
under the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada, was
modified and adopted for NAFTA to include both countries’ relations with
Mexico. 79 The U.S. supported the binational panel on the basis that it would
“make dispute resolution more efficient, and thereby mak[ing] the trading bloc
more efficient.”80 Thus, a compromise was struck between Canada’s desire to
have NAFTA as a common trading area where the laws of neither country would
apply, and the U.S.’s desire for Canada to “eliminate all Canadian government
subsidy programs.”81

IV. THE NAFTA BINATIONAL PANEL: AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
APPELLATE MECHANISM
Binational panels are currently only available in the U.S. to NAFTA
countries (Canada and Mexico) when disputing positive findings of (1) dumping
and (2) material injury to the U.S. domestic market.82 Chapter 19 of NAFTA
allows for binational panel proceedings as an alternative to the current dumping
appeals process of judicial review in U.S. domestic courts.83
75
See H.R.3450, 3450—11, 103d Cong. § 108(5)(a),(k) (1993), GPO.Gov,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr3450enr/pdf/BILLS-103hr3450enr.pdf.
76
See Chapter One: Objectives, article 102(1)(a), NAFTA Secretariat, (May 13, 2013),
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=FullView&mid=1214&language
=en-US&#b55964ef-f08f-4554-a1a9-9bc888941cdc.
77
Id. at art. 102(e).
78
See Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An
Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379, 383 (1999) [hereinafter
Pan].
79
Id. at 384.
80
See Burton, supra note 73, at 1549, n.82.
81
See id.
82
See generally Tracy, supra note 29, at 186.
83
North American Free Trade Agreement, pmbl., chp. 19, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Under NAFTA Article 1904, a petitioner that disagrees with: “alleged
injury” from Commerce and the ITC in the United States may opt for binational
panel review instead of the regular U.S. judicial review system.84 While a party
may opt for a panel in lieu of judges, the panels are tasked with applying “the
importing party’s domestic antidumping law.” 85 In most cases, the binational
panels uphold Commerce decisions. However on unresolved matters of law or
determinations lacking evidence, the panelists are more likely to step away from
U.S. law and apply past binational panel precedent.86
Each of the NAFTA nations must keep an ongoing roster of lawyers in good
standing that may serve on the five-member binational panel. During a dispute,
each country appoints two panelists, and the two countries agree on the fifth
panelist.87 The countries have 55 days from the request for a panel to agree on
the fifth member, but if they cannot agree, they must draw lots to decide, by the
61st day, who will be the fifth panelist.88 The panel, in its ruling, can uphold
agency action or send back to the agency for further action.89 The timeline that
the panel follows is one intended to speed up the process of appealing final
antidumping duties.90
Once a binational panel has issued a determination, the ITC “shall within the
period specified by the panel or committee, take action not inconsistent with the
decision of the panel or committee.”91 Furthermore, binational panel decisions
are not subject to domestic judicial review and “no court of the United States
shall have power or jurisdiction to review such action on any question of law or
fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.” 92 But, strictly
speaking, panels do not bind future panels.93
In situations where the parties dispute the binational panel’s ruling, there is a
three-person Extraordinary Challenge Committee available, but reviews under
the auspices of this appeals panel are rare.94 The party’s government may petition
for this extraordinary measure if it feels there was a conflict of interest, or if
there was a fundamental departure from a rule of procedure.95
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See Tracy, supra note 29, at 177.
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See Pan, supra note 78, at 445.
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See NAFTA Secretariat, supra note 75, at annex 1901.2.
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See Tracy, supra note 29, at 188.
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See Angel R. Oquendo, The Comparative and the Critical Perspective in International
Agreements, 15 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 205 at 218 (1997).
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19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(7)(A).
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See Tracy, supra note 29, at 187, n.74 (citing to NAFTA art. 1904, para. 9 indicating the
case’s concern with “the Involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the
Parties that is before the panel”).
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Id. at 188.
95
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 70, Chap. 19, annex 1904.13.
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Ideal Timeline for a NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel Review as per the Rules of
Procedure
R. 34

Request for Panel Review filed

Day 0

R. 39

Complaints to be filed

Within 30 days after
Request for Panel Review

R. 40

Notices of Appearance to be filed

Within 45 days after
Request for Panel Review

Annex
1901.2(3)

Panel Selection to be completed by
the Parties by

Day 55

R. 41

Final Determination, Reasons, Index Within 15 days after filing
and Administrative Record to be
of Notice of Appearance
filed

Annex
1901.2(3)

Parties to select 5th Panelist by

Day 61

R. 57 (1)

Briefs by Complainants to be filed

Within 60 days after filing
of Administrative Record

R. 57(2)

Briefs by Investigating Authority or
Participants in support to be filed

Within 60 days after
Complainants’ Briefs

R. 57(3)

Reply Briefs to be filed

Within 15 days after
Authority’s Briefs

R. 57(4)

Appendix to the Briefs to be filed

Within 10 days after Reply
Briefs

R. 67(1)

Oral Argument to begin

Within 30 days after Reply
Briefs

Article
PANEL DECISION DUE
315 days after Request for
1904.14
Panel Review
Figure 2: NAFTA Binational Panel Sample Schedule for appealing antidumping
duties.96
This article argues that binational panels should be further expanded and
implemented for those countries with whom the U.S. has negotiated special
bilateral agreements, such as the Republic of Korea through the KORUS FTA.
This will foster trade relations with the largest U.S. trading partners, while still
protecting domestic markets against harm.

96

See NAFTA Secretariat, supra note 76.

Powell – The NAFTA Alternative: Saving Korus FTA Dumping Appeals from the Dumps

49

V. THE BINATIONAL PANEL: EMBODIMENT OF THE WTO SPIRIT
In this era of global free trade, the trend has become to reduce tariffs through
trade agreements, yet simultaneously to use trade remedies as a backstop against
the same trading partners.97 In the face of this, the WTO Agreement continues to
stand for the notion that global trade should be unrestricted.98 While the WTO
Agreement upholds the ideals of free trade, it also acknowledges the continuation
of certain non-tariff barriers, such as antidumping duties.99 Similar to the United
States’ dumping provisions, antidumping duties are assessed under the WTO
Agreement when a member country can show that an item was imported into the
country in question for less than fair value.100 The WTO Agreement allows each
Member country the discretion to establish a unique national antidumping
regime, but nonetheless requires Members to adhere to core precepts in order to
ensure a substantial degree of consistency and uniformity amongst the Member
regimes.101
The United States is a signatory to the antidumping provisions in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT”) 102 and the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (the WTO Antidumping
Agreement),103 which hammer out guidelines for WTO Members in adjudicating
antidumping disputes and assessing subsequent duties. Countries are free to
administer their own antidumping laws as long as they comply with the terms of
the WTO Antidumping Agreement.104
The U.S. felt that Article VI of the GATT diluted the original antidumping
authority given to nations.105 The U.S. position on the GATT panels shifted from
the early 1980s, when the United States was winning antidumping conflicts over
other countries, to the late 1980s, where panel decisions went against the U.S.
and U.S. negotiators opted instead to support deference to national authority
decisions.106 Nevertheless, the United States has since amended its own domestic
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See Zheng, supra note 20, at 155.
See Reid M. Bolton, Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping Duties under
the W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 66, 70 (2011) [hereinafter
Bolton].
99
Id.
100
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
101
See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protectionism in the New Millennium: The Ascendency
of Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 49 at 75 (1997).
102
See GATT, supra note 100.
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See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, 68 U.N.T.S. 201 (1994).
104
See Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Subsidies
Agreements: Did the United States Achieve its Objectives During the Uruguay Round?, 31
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 871 at 872 (2000).
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Id. at 871.
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Id.
98

50

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39, 2015]

antidumping law,107 effectively implementing the system prescribed by the WTO
Agreement, “except as specifically noted.”108
In addition to domestic remedies that a country may enact, the WTO
Agreement has a Dispute Settlement Body 109 that members may petition to
resolve trade issues. 110 The procedure involves first, a consultation with the
disputing country, and then the country may seek a dispute resolution panel
under the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes. 111 The WTO panels are enforceable under binding
dispute resolution.112 This Dispute Settlement Body is utilized by various WTO
members, and it encourages settlement of disputes, resembling the NAFTA
binational panel process.
Since 1995 the United States has referred 13 antidumping matters involving
Korea to the WTO dispute settlement system, Korea has likewise initiated 32
against the United States.113 While the WTO does provide this alternative dispute
mechanism, “[t]he standard of review by panels (and by the Appellate Body) in
most WTO proceedings is considerably broader than the general standard in the
United States for review of administrative decisions . . . [.]”114 Much of the U.S.
scholarly criticism about NAFTA binational panels concerns panelists’ utilizing
the “correct” standard of review, the U.S. Chevron standard. Having KORUS
FTA disputes go before the WTO dispute settlement system could potentially
attract a more neutral standard of review.

VI. FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A BINATIONAL PANEL FOR THE KORUS
FTA
Arguments against the application of a binational panel process between
Korea and the United States include the fact that binational panels are not
favored by many American trade authors.115 Accusations have been that (A) the
differences in culture and laws will make it difficult to maintain a separate
appellate panel, and (B) that it is undesirable to leave trade remedies in the hands
of panelists who are not judges, but rather professionals who may misapply U.S.

107

See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 Title VII, updated through Pub.
L. No. 103-465 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a), supra note 10.
108
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp 670, 673 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1981).
109
See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp.
Law 457 at 470 (2002) [hereinafter Bhala & Gantz].
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Bolton, supra note 98, at 76.
113
Anti-dumping Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country 01/01/1995 31/12/2012, WTO, WTO.Org, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsRep
MemVsExpCty.pdf.
114
See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 109, at 615.
115
See generally Tracy, supra note 29, at 187, n.74 (citing NAFTA art. 1904, para. 9,
which states “the Involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that
is before the panel”).
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domestic law, and (C) that the antidumping system is inherently flawed and its
complete disbandment is desirable to all other solutions.
A. Overcoming Differences
1. Language

Arguments against the implementation of a separate binational panel process
for the KORUS-FTA may include the language hurdle of having panelists versed
in both English and Korean. Under the NAFTA binational panels, proceedings
for the United States and Canada can take place in both English and French.116
Mexico has experienced similar barriers, but the procedural leniency in NAFTA
would also allow for proceedings in Spanish, if parties so chose.117 The NAFTA
experience of these proceedings taking place in different languages can help
Korea and the United States institute a binational panel in both languages,
without pioneering the notion.
2. Legal Systems

Arguments against the feasibility of a binational panel may also emphasize
that Korea is a civil law country whereas the United States works under a
common law system. 118 While the legal systems are different, South Korea’s
administrative and corporate laws are modeled after the United States system.119
Additionally, the NAFTA binational panels, as an example, draw from the same
pool of professionals as WTO dispute settlement panels. This indicates that the
roster for a potential KORUS FTA antidumping binational panel can get a
running start by drawing from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body roster. 120
Furthermore, Mexican WTO panelists have transitioned onto the NAFTA
binational panels with ease.121 As of 1999, five of seven NAFTA decisions were
authored, in part, by Mexican panelists, indicating no cultural or legal
difficulty.122
There is already a system in place in the KORUS FTA that allows for
investor-state dispute settlement between investors and either the United States
or Korean governments, as the case may be. 123 Korea and the U.S. afford
investors domestic-like treatment,124 and for dispute settlements, either countries’
investors can seek arbitration panels, appointed by the Secretary General of the
116
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118
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korus/asset_upload_file587_12710.pdf.
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 125 A similar
provision was included in the NAFTA, and while some authorities cite the cost
and the inconvenience to the United States, “[t]o date, the United States has
prevailed in all investor-state cases brought against it.126 This system provides
yet another foundation for an alternative dispute system for antidumping appeals.
B. Trade Practitioners Versus Judges

While those who serve on the NAFTA binational panels are not judges, they
are experienced legal professionals who remain on the country’s NAFTA
binational panel roster in case their services are needed.127 Some legal scholars
have noted that rather than having full-time judges on the panel, panelists are
individuals who must balance jobs outside the panel with their job as panelists.128
Cross-referencing the NAFTA binational panels and the WTO antidumping
dispute panels show that over half the names appear on both panels for the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.129 While they may not be judges, they will
have a better understanding of legal issues if they participate in antidumping
proceedings in two different legal settings.
Furthermore, the accusation that panelists do not apply American law as
consistently as judges has led some critics to point to the Wire Rod case.130 One
critic argued that the binational panel “broke with NAFTA directives” by
applying WTO law over binding U.S. law,131 although Commerce later got rid of
the controversial methodology for the assessment of dumping at issue in Wire
Rod.132 A critic of the Wire Rod case admitted that the binational panel used the
first Chevron prong in assessing whether there was dumping, but because the
panel decided that Congress explicitly denounced zeroing and that Commerce
violated the explicit rule by assessing dumping penalties using this method of
calculation, the author felt that this was not the application of the rule as U.S.
judges would have concluded.133 This argument, even if taken in the light most
favorable to this critic, does not demonstrate that the panel failed to apply U.S.
law, as the panel did undertake a Chevron analysis. The author’s argument thus
125
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seems premised on the disappointment that the American industry did not
emerge victorious.
While the binational panel decision itself is not reviewable,134 NAFTA does
grant “exclusive original jurisdiction over constitutional attacks on binational
panels” to the United States for the District of Columbia Circuit. 135 If either
country in the proceeding felt there was a constitutional issue at hand in an
appeal of a U.S. antidumping determination, they could file a constitutional
action before the D.C. Circuit within thirty days of final notice publication in the
Federal Register of the completion of the binational panel.136
C. Scrapping the System Entirely: Impractical

While there is much scholarship for repealing antidumping remedies
altogether, this article is written with awareness that doing so would be
“politically infeasible in the current protectionist atmosphere of Congress.” 137
This article acknowledges that eliminating trade remedies altogether is an
impractical solution since even the WTO Agreement recognizes antidumping
duties as a valid trade remedy and has its own system of review of antidumping
determinations.138
This article argues that for the United States’ largest trading partners Canada, Mexico, and if extended, Korea - binational panels are a more effective
way of dealing with trade disputes that arise. Binational panels are an alternative
appeals system that sufficiently acknowledge the special trade relationships that
the United States has. Carving out this exception would ensure that its biggest
trade allies are not subjected to the stigma and penalties of being branded and
penalized as dumpers under the current rigged system.

VII. CONCLUSION: THE UNTENABLE STATUS QUO
The United States is celebrating the successful first anniversary of prosperity
and enhanced exports with the Republic of Korea under the KORUS FTA. The
elimination of trade duties on the front end are shouted from the rafters, but a
prejudicial backstop remains.
The current antidumping system in U.S. law has effectively handicapped the
ability of U.S. trading partners to appeal petitions against them. There will
always be self-interest at play in trade relations, but if the United States
continues to allow domestic corporations to petition the Commission and the ITC
to cut out the competition, then foreign competitors are doomed from the start:
once a dumper, always a dumper. Court deference to agencies under the Chevron
134
See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2)(A)-(B) (stating “if binational panel review of a
determination is requested pursuant to article 1904 of the NAFTA or of the Agreement, then
. . . the determination is not reviewable under subsection (a) of this section, and . . . no court of
the United States has power or jurisdiction to review the determination on any question of law
or fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise”).
135
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136
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137
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principle has made appeals virtually impossible. However, in the specific
instance of the NAFTA binational panel process, the United States has
acknowledged the special trade relationship it has with its North American
counterparts and carved out an exception to its own impenetrable system.
This exception should be applied to Korea and binational panels should be
implemented for antidumping disputes under the KORUS FTA. The barriers to
establishing the panel are not insurmountable and much of the ground work has
already been laid with Canada and Mexico. For the United States to continue to
refuse to acknowledge the hypocrisy of knocking down Korean trade barriers,
while simultaneously fortifying its wall against Korean exports would be to go
against the very spirit of the free trade movement championed by the WTO
Agreement. Binational panels are a simple solution to a continuing trade
injustice.

